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Embodiment just is the problem, not the solution
The organizing principles of Embodied Cognition (EC) have been paraphrased in many ways: for
example, mental phenomena cannot be explained in terms of internal information-processing
states independent of the details of bodily implementation; explaining cognition requires
explaining bodily function and sensorimotor activity; thinking is deeply constrained by physical
processes or properties instantiating it; cognition cannot be fruitfully understood without
knowing how the body ‘shapes’ it, etc.
All such paraphrases imply that the proper context for evaluating the framework is nothing less
than the old mind/body problem. Yet, within this context, EC faces at least three immediate
challenges. One is the challenge of actually getting an explanation off the ground. The old
mind/body problem begins by granting or assuming that minds are somehow related to bodies,
and then poses the question of how to precisely articulate the nature of that relation. If EC is to be
worth taking seriously, it must be possible to state its principles in away such that they do not turn
out to be a mere restatement of the very assumptions that made the old mind/body problem a
problem in the first place. Thus, it is crucial to distinguish ‘embodiment’ as it refers to the
explanandum (i.e. the problem under investigation) versus an explanans (i.e. as the name of a
putative solution). Of course, EC is rarely touted as issuing any such substantive metaphysical
explanation that would shed light on the presence of that mind/body relation. But that is no reason
for supposing that it need not give one, and there are good reasons for supposing that it must.
A second challenge, then, is to formulate a positive explanation. As an attempt to stand Classical
Cartesian Cognitivism (CCC) on its head, the organizing principle—however paraphrased—are not
insignificant. Yet, if EC is to count as more than a narrow, negative critique, its proponents cannot
merely state what the mind/body relation is not, or how one might fail to explain it. A third, related
challenge is that of articulating a positive explanation that is informative. Overcoming the first two
challenges is unhelpful unless thepositive reformulations of EC’s organizingprinciple canbe shown
not to lapse into trivializations when put in sufficiently general positive terms, for example, that
minds depend on or are supported by bodily interaction with the world.
Attempts to meet these three challenges have yielded underwhelming analyses. Many EC
researchers have utilized the language of ‘arising’, ‘bringing forth’, ‘emergence’, as in the claim of
Thelen et al., (2001, p. 1) that ‘to say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily
interactionswith the world’. Yet, underlying concepts like ARISE or EMERGENCE are rarely unpacked,
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overused, and often muddled. For example, Lakoff (1987, p. 12) asserted that the relation between
mental phenomena and embodiment is one of consequence: ‘[cognition is] a consequence of the
nature of human biological capacities and of the experience of functioning in a physical and social
environment’. But what might it mean to say that the relation is one of ‘consequence’? Is the claim
that lower-level bodily phenomena cause higher-level cognitive states?1 Similarly, Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch (1991, pp. 172–73) defined the view with the following two conditions:
‘first, cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that comes from having a bodywith various
sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves
embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context’. Varela et al.’s
first condition involves a relation of dependency, while the second takes the relata to occur in
contexts; but dependence-in-context hardly makes for an informative explanation. What do such
dependence relations consist in? How are they different from, say, supervenience, determination,
correspondence, counterfactual dependence, mereological constitution, or realization? Generally,
EC researchers lack answers here.
Embodied cognition: A framework in search of itself?
Some EC researchers have focused their attention on transduction (i.e. mapping the constituents
of perceptual experience on to arbitrary symbols representing conceptual structure); many more
have instead focused on symbol grounding (i.e. mapping those symbols back on to the world), and
thus the corollary project of analysing the concept Embodiment in terms of a more basic relation
designated by GROUNDING. As such, GROUNDING is currently enjoying wide influence in many of
areas of Empirical Psychology and Cognitive Science; some have even suggested that analysis of
grounding is the central project of EC (e.g. Anderson, 2003, p. 92). Yet, others have suggested the
converse: e.g. ‘Through embodiment, symbols get physically grounded, and such meaning is
defined through interaction with the world’ (Riegler, 2002, p. 341). Such claims illustrate the
unstable, disunified theoretical foundations of EC (e.g. it is absurd to treat EMBODIMENT and
GROUNDING as simultaneously designating relations that are each conceptually prior to the other).
EC’s more judicious proponents seem rightly anxious about whether or to what extent
appeals to ‘embodiment’ can perform serious explanatory work. As Clark (1999, p. 345)
diplomatically put it, ‘There is clearly a shift in thinking [about cognition] but the nature and
importance of the shift is surprisingly hard to pin down. What is “Embodied Cognitive
Science” : : : ?’. In his field review, Anderson concurs more candidly: ‘It is clear that [EC] has yet to
settle on a shared account of “embodiment”: indeed, there is little explicit discussion of its
meaning, as if it were a simple term in little need of analysis. [ : : : ] It is incumbent on the field to
say something substantial about its meaning’ (2003, p. 103). A common response from its
apologists is that EC is still a fledgling research programme, in which case we should not (yet)
expect it to provide such nuanced explanations and analyses, and should at the very least be
tolerant of any disunity or opacity in its vocabulary, procedures, and theoretical commitments
(Shapiro, 2007). On the contrary, the time has come to stop apologizing, and—as Anderson rightly
acknowledges—start saying something more substantial.
My intention here is that the way to long-term progress is to start correcting an imbalance of
research. Specifically, mounting experimental evidence has given EC momentum in fleshing out
theoretical problems inherent in the separation ofmind and body; yet, themore that proponents of
EC compile experimental evidence, the more the fundamental concepts of EC remain in the dark.2
1 Surely not, for much the same reasons that water is not a consequence of H2O or that mean molecular kinetic
energy does not cause heat.
2 For example, given the wide scope of EC research, ‘grounding’ has come to refer to an n-place relation that holds of
perception, action, language, and virtually all other psychological phenomena. Our over-exuberance about the
phenomena of which such an n-place relation might hold has led to GROUNDING designating a rather unconstrained
relation. And the danger in being unconstrained is that the construct ends up as being so powerful that it magically
explains everything.
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This conundrum is nicely exemplified by Pecher and Zwaan’s (2005) Grounding Cognition—an
edited collection of 12 new articles by prominent researchers in the field of EC. This book aims to
programmatically showcase an array of empirical results and analysis alluding to the
interdependence of perception, action, and language. Its successes in this endeavour nicely
epitomize current directions among the various research provinces of EC. Psychologists interested
in EC are sure to find something of interest here, given the strong merits of individual chapters and
the range of topics covered. The drawback, however, is that such successes are symptomatic of
the disproportion between experimental progress and theoretical clarification. In particular,
GROUNDING—now one of the theoretical cornerstones of the EC movement—remains
unilluminated. A major lacuna of the volume as a whole, then, is that it fails to articulate just
what the grounding relation is. Subsequently, this volume exemplifies the need for a new direction
in EC.Nowmore than ever, concepts like EMBODIMENTand GROUNDING are in dire need of someplain
old-fashioned conceptual analysis. In that sense, EC is grounded until further notice.
From embodiment to grounding: More than just a shell game?
The volume leads with Borghi’s ambitious ‘Object concepts and action; which attempts to marshal
evidence for a thesis about the relation between concepts and sensorimotor activity. The evidence
is a stout collage of neo-Gibsonian work on affordances, ventral/dorsal streams of visual
processing, eye-tracking and neuroimaging results, controlled linguistic judgments, etc. But what
is that thesis? It is difficult to ascertain, for Borghi makes use of numerous candidates and rides
roughshod over their differences. Each is closely related and occasionally the differences do not
make much of a difference; yet, the various candidate theses are not merely alternative ways of
stating the same thought. Some are speculations about the nature of concepts simpliciter; some
are conjectures about the sort of properties that some classes of concepts exhibit; some are claims
about words; others are claims about conceptual function, role, or purpose. Hence, the litany of
candidate theses makes it difficult to guess which evidence Borghi considers evidence for which
claim. Hence, getting clear about Borghi’s thesis is necessary for evaluating whether the reviewed
evidence establishes what she thinks it does. Whichever ends up being Borghi’s thesis, it seems
that her concern is properly relegated only to a small subset of object concepts—i.e. manipulable
human-scale object concepts of a certain everyday sort (e.g. spoon, pencil ). And extended
to more interesting cases, that thesis becomes as increasingly bold and interesting as it does
tenuous.3
Borghi’s contribution does serve to bring into relief a central theme of Pecher and Zwaan’s
volume: the characterization of the grounding of abstract concepts. This theme is taken up again
in Barsalou and Wiemar-Hastings’ ‘Situating abstract concepts’. They assert four general theses
about abstract concepts,4 and then report on an exploratory study designed to specify the
grounded content of nine particular concepts. Barsalou and Wiemar-Hastings take their study to
demonstrate several points about conceptual content across different grades of abstraction: that
context partially determines conceptual content, concrete concepts pertain to physical objects
more than abstract concepts, and abstract concepts exhibit greater amounts of organizational
complexity because they appeal to more diverse categories of information. These points are surely
correct so far as they go; but how could such a study—which involves little more than a free
3 For what ‘online simulations’ do object concepts like Monolith or Supernova activate? In what sense does the
human-scale concept Cyst or Cupola ‘support interaction’? Are berth or glacier ‘concept-nouns [that] activate
motor responses automatically’? And since manipulable human-scale concepts do not exhaust the class of object
concepts – much less concepts more generally – it becomes all the more important to recognize which of the above
theses should be sloughed off. So it is unsurprising when Borghi herself begins doing just this: ‘concepts that do not
refer to objects, such as abstract concepts like freedom and truth [ : : : ] probably do not elicit motor images’ (p. 29).
4 The theses are: (i) both concrete and abstract concepts share situational content; (ii) concrete and abstract
concepts differ in situational focus; (iii) abstract concepts are more complex than concrete concepts; (iv) the
situational content of abstract concepts could, in principle, be simulated.
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association task—possibly demonstrate what Barsalou and Wiemar-Hastings think it does? The
authors’ reproduction of a representative response strikingly reveals that the data consist of
untrained undergraduates producing rambling, unreflective answers. Yet, an analysis of that data –
however sophisticated – hardly serves as a diagnostic assay of the particular abstract concepts
investigated, much less than what the general nature of abstract conceptual content is. After all,
concepts like TRUTH, FREEDOM, and INVENTION involve innumerable ‘layers’ of highly specialized
senses and rich substantive conceptual structure (of the sort that many scholars spend their
careers trying to characterize).5
In any case, the real promise of both Borghi’s and Barsalou and Wiemar-Hastings’ chapters –
i.e. the explication of grounding in terms of simulation – goes unrealized. Borghi’s review focuses
on motor-based neural activation patterns responsible for simulating interaction with abstract
concepts’ action-relevant properties, but only ends up concluding that such ‘simulated
interaction’ assumes an analysis of GROUNDING, and thus EMBODIMENT (p. 28). And Barsalou and
Wiemar-Hastings are concerned not to be misunderstood as having demonstrated evidence for any
theses about grounding or embodiment; instead, they conclude with speculations about whether
abstract conceptual content could possibly be explained as a function of mnemonic simulations of
previously perceived situations. Such speculations are interesting, important, and plausible; and
their development is praiseworthy. Just the same, they come with a highly anti-climactic caveat
that simply ignores the aforementioned challenges facing EC – namely, to show how abstract
concepts are actually grounded via perceptual simulation in modality-specific bodily systems.
Chapters by Prinz and by Glenberg et al. use emotions as a test case to take up this task of
suggesting how abstract concepts are grounded actually. The chapters are nicely
complementary, though Glenberg et al.’s focus lies more with the body’s ‘influence’ on the
linguistic expression of affect, whereas Prinz’s desire is to continue fanning the flames of recent
neo-Humean empiricist work on moral concepts using an updated version of the James–Lange
theory of emotions. Prinz’s ‘Passionate thoughts: the emotional embodiment of moral concepts’
begins by spelling out his hardline empiricist view that takes concepts to be stored copies of
modality-specific perceptual states serving to encode information about ontological categories
in order to produce adaptive behavioural responses. With that background, Prinz defends
the following thesis. Moral concepts (e.g. GOOD, BAD ) are dispositions that are instantiated in
emotions and emotional feelings under certain conditions; in-turn, emotions are commands for
action (consistent with many of Borghi’s theses), and emotional feelings are noncognitive
internal perceptions of bodily reactions to those commands in the presence of external stimuli.
Therefore, Prinz argues, abstract moral concepts are grounded in the sense that they are ‘linked’
to the body via emotions (p. 94). It is a virtue of Prinz’s theory that it makes sense of several
aspects of abstract moral concepts in an experimentally tractable way; but the most pressing
problem is that his theory simply pushes back the question of what, exactly, grounding relations
are. Prinz mentions linkage—but what relation is that? Prinz likely has a story to tell here—one
which fits with his account of moral concepts as dispositions to experience affective states
and bodily processes of self-perception. Nevertheless, Prinz—like any proponent of EC—still
owes us that story.
In their chapter, ‘Grounding language in bodily states: the case for emotions’, Glenberg et al.
describe an interesting experiment that manipulated bodily states during a language
comprehension task. While alternating between holding pens with their teeth (to force a
partial smile) or lips (to force a partial frown), participants were asked to judge affective
valences of sentences. Resultingly, comprehension was quicker by an average of 122ms
for , teeth, pleasant . ) conditions, and slower by 45ms for , lips, unpleasant. conditions. To
rule out the confounding possibility that participants’ bodily state was interacting with rating the
valence of affective sentences rather than comprehension of their emotional content, the authors
5 A follow-up study focusing on GROUNDING or EMBODIMENT itself – rather than TRUTH, FREEDOM, or INVENTION –
might very well be fruitful.
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executed a further experiment asking them to rate the ease of comprehension and timing their
responses. The results of this second experiment were a bit muddier, but nevertheless contributed
to the indication of an overall interaction between pen £ sentential valence conditions. On the
basis of this evidence, insofar as manipulation of emotional state by facial configuration is a reliable
indicator of whether comprehension of affective language is facilitated by bodily state, Glenberg
et al. cautiously defend what they call the ‘strong embodiment claim’ about emotional language
comprehension – namely, that it is grounded in bodily states.6 To their credit, Glenberg et al. do
attempt some clarification that goes beyond other writers’ enigmatic ‘x is grounded in y’ claims;
they write, ‘understanding of language about emotional states requires that those emotional states
be simulated, or partially induced, using the same neural and bodily mechanisms as are recruited
during emotional experiences’ (p. 120). But now the same problem seems to recur. Whereas some
like Borghi and Barsalou and Wiemar-Hastings explain simulation in terms of grounding, Glenberg
et al. explain grounding in terms of simulation. Further, their ‘strong embodiment claim’ turns out
to be rather pallid: it amounts to a single necessary condition (i.e. simulations by neural
mechanisms are necessary for emotional language comprehension), and, furthermore, does not
obviously apply to certain abstract concepts at that. Hence, even if their evidence offers
(provisional) warrant for the existence of grounding relations, much more detailed analysis about
the nature of grounding is needed.
Many chapters focus on the putative grounding of language in perception, and virtually all
take the analysis of grounding relations for granted. In their ‘On the perceptual-motor and
image-schematic infrastructure of language’, Spivey et al. argue that perception, action, and
language interact and/or interface by sharing common representational formats, and adduce
a wealth of compelling evidence for the interaction of linguistic and spatial representations
(e.g. that verb comprehension influences image-schematic encoding of visual stimuli). Yet,
establishing that perception, action, and language ‘interact’, ‘interface’, or are ‘interdependent’
– even if true and backed by a wealth of evidence – does nothing to elaborate what that
interaction, interfacing, and interdependence consists in. Again, such claims are mere
placeholders for more informative accounts of grounding such that it relates language and
perception. Both Carlson and Kenny’s ‘Constraints on spatial language comprehension’, and
Zwaan and Madden’s ‘Embodied sentence comprehension’ likewise focus on language
comprehension. The research presented is highly interesting and provides a great evidential
corrective to CCC; yet, once again, GROUNDING and EMBODIMENT serve as little more than a
backdrop for both chapters.
Cognizers’ imaginative abilities to variably construe situations for expressive purposes are
another central theme of Pecher and Zwaan’s volume. Zwaan and Madden, for instance,
propose that concepts are massively interconnected ‘experiential traces laid down in memory’
during perception and interaction, which originate with association mechanisms of Hebbian
learning (p. 227). Following Langacker, these experiential traces are taken to then be used in
construal, where ‘construal’ is defined as the mental simulation of an experience conveyed by
an attention frame. Three other chapters address the relation between embodied experience
and these imaginative abilities Gibbs’s ‘Embodiment in metaphorical imagination’, MacWhin-
ney’s ‘The emergence of grammar from perspective’, and Langacker’s ‘DYNAMICITY, FICTIVITY,
and SCANNING’. All three chapters are founded on the commitment to linguistic expressions
being important sources of evidence for explaining the bodily basis of mental phenomena.
Langacker’s chapter presents a synoptic view of his cognitive linguistic research on three
important concepts relevant to the analysis of the ‘mental gymnastics’ pervasive in cognition:
DYNAMICITY, FICTIVITY, and SCANNING. Gibbs’ article summarizes his previous work on the
6 In addition to not establishing whether the manipulations of facial configurations reflect interference as well as
facilitation of language comprehension, they note two failed pilot studies attempting to establish a neutral condition
(holding pen either with hands or between knees); their second reason for caution involves the consistency of their
evidence with claims other than that of strong embodiment.
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relationships between metaphor, imaginative abilities, and embodiment. By appealing to several
well-worn metaphors and idiomatic expressions, as well as some anecdotal evidence, Gibbs
makes a suggestive case for the existence of a relation between bodily states and the
imaginative abilities required for mapping from source to target domains. The evidence from
metaphors is fascinating, but yields no insights as to the nature of that relation. Indeed, from
his definition of ‘embodiment’, which is often synonymously used with ‘grounding’ and
‘grounded’, one is tempted to infer that Gibbs would simply assert that the ground of cognition
is some sort of three-way interaction between brain, body, and environment (p. 67). Needless
to say, such assertions exemplify why proponents of EC have the theoretical problems they do.
MacWhinney’s chapter aims to show that perspective-taking is the common denominator for
‘knitting together all of cognition’ (p. 199). He uses an instructive range of technical examples
(e.g. clitic assimilation, syntactic ambiguity, reflexivization, pronominal coreferentiality), but
once again, no informative elaboration about what grounding relations are, or how appeal to
them might clarify the concept EMBODIMENT, is forthcoming. The difficult conceptual work on
this point is left for others, though – more than most – Langacker’s chapter picks up some of
the slack here. He is generally careful about precisely defining his terms according to their
usage within the theory of Cognitive Grammar – e.g. the technical term ‘ground’ is conceived
of as a tripleton {speaker(s), hearer(s), immediate speech event} and used in the specific sense
relevant to that programme.
The volume’s last chapter, Goldstone et al.’s ‘Connecting concepts to each other and the
world’, makes for a curious addition – highly interesting unto itself, but fairly peripheral to the
main aims of Grounding Cognition. It presents a connectionist model (‘ABSURDIST’) for
addressing issues of incommensurability and translation between any two conceptual systems A
and B by employing formal constraint satisfaction algorithms that are said to specify when two
individuals possess the same concept. Basically, ABSURDIST works by uncovering
correspondences between conceptual elements {x, y} via matching and maximizing the
similarity relations of their conceptual roles {R1, : : : , Rn}, such that x [ A corresponds to y [ B
iff Rx ; Ry. High activation of network units is treated as a measure of consistent translation
between conceptual systems. As with other formal models of meaning based on interdefinability
patterns among arbitrary symbols (e.g. HAL, LSA), Goldstone et al. claim that semantic value
obtains merely via alignment among interdefinable network elements; of course, this leaves open
the question of whether such values are, in part, determined by their correspondences to the
external world (i.e. ‘grounded’?). Rather than taking internalist and externalist accounts of
meaning to be mutually exclusive, the authors sensibly endorse a synergistic perspective: models
like ABSURDIST show that purely within-systems translation is possible without invoking
correspondences to the world, but that external grounding (i.e. ‘extensionalist semantics’?)
increases translational efficacy and reinforces the partitioning of (non-)correspondences.
What is the concept Grounding a concept of?
The aim of Pecher and Zwaan’s (2005) Grounding Cognition was to shed some light on the
subject of how cognition is grounded. What it achieves is a demonstration that EC is,
unfortunately, all trees and no forest. On one hand, the volume does a great job assembling an
impressive array of experimental and linguistic data about the relationships between cognition,
perception, and action – the effect of which is to indicate that CCC is an unviable research
programme. Some of the chapters might even involve benchmark advances. On the other hand,
such evidence needs to be ‘grounded’ in more adequate theoretical foundations. That the very
concept of grounding itself turns out to be theoretically opaque (and thus inadequate for
illuminating the relation of embodiment) is exemplified by the fact that the level of overall
clarification does not much exceed that of the dust jacket: ‘recent developments in cognitive
science view cognition no longer in terms of abstract information processing, but in terms
of perception and action. In other words, cognition is grounded in embodied experiences’.
Being an anthology, this is certainly pardonable. Nevertheless, the introduction misses a great
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opportunity to provide some real insight here, for nowhere is there any discussion of what is
meant in uttering the phrase ‘cognition is grounded in embodied experience’. Consequently, the
volume takes its place among an ever-growing list of texts that inadequately specify what
GROUNDING – or any of the other fundamental concepts of EC – is the concept of.
Hence, what is needed is a prequel to Grounding Cognition – one that generates an account
of the nature and scope of grounding relations themselves. For instance, one might suggest an
error-theoretic account, according to which the very idea of there being a metaphysically distinct
grounding relation – one which stands alongside correspondence relations or other structural
‘mappings’, identity, supervenience or asymmetric determination relations, various types of
entailment, causation, etc. – is irretrievably doomed from the outset. On an error-theoretic view,
nothing actually answers to the term ‘grounding’ – we just talk as if there were because such ways
of talking are convenient. But then, our theories about the relationships between perception,
action, and language are better off by positing relations that are better understood and can be
more precisely articulated and analysed, such as supervenience or identity. For my part, I think
there might be something to this suggestion. Alternatively, one might suggest that GROUNDING
designates a very simple relational property of certain mental phenomena that plays an
explanatory role in a theory of cognition, but that it is a primitive concept. And because we cannot
give revealing definitions of it in terms of clearer or even more fundamental concepts, we should
accept that the status and import of basic concepts like GROUNDING is what forecloses on the
possibility of providing them with a more profound conceptual foundation. A third approach
might be to show how EC’s organizing principles are clarified and streamlined by formulating a
reductive analysis of the form ‘x is grounded if and only if x is F’, where F is a relational property of
x (alt. ‘x is grounded in y if and only if x bears R to y’). Such an approach assumes that
understanding what the nature of grounding relations consists in will facilitate understanding
how it is that cognition is embodied. This is not to suggest that characterizations must take the
form of an analytic definition, and whether formalization is necessary is a further (and possibly
irrelevant) question; rather, what is important is that proponents of EC give a characterization that
is insightful or otherwise illuminating. And with a more adequate theoretical understanding, the
empirical evidence supporting EC’s main theses – like that adduced in the contributions of
Grounding Cognition – stands to become all the more significant.
In sum, I have noted that EC should be situated and evaluated within the context of the old
mind/body problem, that it faces several challenges when so situated, and that attempts to meet
these challenges by using GROUNDING to clarify the positive theses of EC have generally been
unsatisfactory. The role of Grounding Cognition in all of this is that of being an exemplar: it
exemplifies, rather than overcomes, the challenges of generating a positive and informative
solution to the old mind/body problem. Of course, this is not to say that the problem is aporetic or
insoluble – after all, the store of putative solutions and accounts on offer is well known. Nor is it to
say that EC researchers necessarily conceive of themselves as working on the old mind/body
problem – many do not conceive themselves as explicitly working on the old mind/body problem
though their rational commitments and organizing principles typically tell otherwise. Still, talk of
‘grounding’ must be adequately characterizable if it is to be useful in scholarly explanations of the
interdependence of perception, action, and language. But as a technical construct in a serious
theory of cognition, it has thus far been insufficiently clear what the concept GROUNDING is a
concept of. Ironically, the lack of clarity – and near-total absence of discussion in some of its main
manifestos – about the nature of the grounding relation has been an unfortunate hallmark of the
EC movement (e.g. Gibbs, 2005; cf. Brisard, 2002). Therein, the explanatory authority of this
construct has consisted in little more than incessant use of words like ‘grounding’ and ‘grounded’
(incessant use which also tends to be incestuously interchangeable with terms like ‘embodiment’
and ‘embodied’). Andwithout this needed clarification, claims of the form ‘x is grounded in y’ tend
to be more limp than limpid.
CORYD.WRIGHT (Departments of Philosophy and Cognitive Science 0119, UCSD, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla,
CA 92093-0119 USA)
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